[Compte-rendu de] Shan Gao, The Meaning of the Wave Function: In Search of the Ontology of Quantum Mechanics, Cambridge University Press, 2017 by Hubert, Mario
Shan Gao, The Meaning of the Wave Function: In Search of the Ontology of 
Quantum Mechanics, Cambridge University Press, 2017, 189pp., $ 140, ​ISBN: 
9781107124356. 
 
Reviewed by Mario Hubert, University of Lausanne 
 
What is the meaning of the wave-function? After almost 100 years since the 
inception of quantum mechanics, is it still possible to say something new on 
what the wave-function is supposed to be? Yes, it is. And Shan Gao managed to 
do so with his newest book. Here we learn what contemporary physicists and 
philosophers think about the wave-function; we learn about the de 
Broglie–Bohm theory, the GRW collapse theory, the gravity-induced collapse 
theory by Roger Penrose, and the famous PBR theorem; we learn about 
Schrödinger’s original idea that the wave-function represents charge densities; 
we learn about the notorious measurement problem and its consequences; we 
learn about the challenges to find a consistent relativistic quantum theory; and 
we learn, of course, Gao’s own suggestion for the status of the wave-function. 
Above all, Gao shows us the significance of protective measurements for our 
search of the ontology of quantum mechanics. Still not widely recognized among 
physicists and philosophers, protective measurements let us look deeper into 
quantum mechanics. For Gao this is the main tool to settle the issue on the 
ontological status of the wave-function: ​the wave-function is real because one 
can measure it​. 
 
Let’s first clarify the meaning of “real” and the meaning of “measure”. The 
meaning of “measure” is easily understood. The wave-function, Gao argues, can 
be measured by means of protective measurements. In quantum mechanics, 
there are (among many others) two distinguished classes of measurements: von 
Neumann measurements and weak measurements. When physicists measure an 
observable they in general mean a von Neumann measurement, which projects 
the wave-function to a certain subspace in Hilbert space—in standard parlance, 
this is the collapse of the wave-function. But apart from “collapsing” the 
wave-function, one can measure a system by letting the measurement 
apparatus interact with the system as weakly as possible, so weakly that the 
wave-function remains (almost) unchanged. Protective measurements are now a 
special class of weak measurements. The crux of protective measurements is 
that they yield the expectation value of an observable with just one 
measurement; the pointer of the apparatus moves to the value of the 
expectation value. The wave-function can be reconstructed from a series of 
protective measurements, which specify the probability density and the 
probability current—in a similar way, the wave-function can be reconstructed 
from a series of weak measurements of its real and imaginary part as done by 
Lundeen et al. (2011). After Gao has explained very clearly the basics of 
protective measurements in the first chapter, they accompany us throughout the 
entire book.  
 
In what sense the wave-function is real is harder to elucidate. Gao argues that 
the wave-function is better not real in the sense of a nomological entity (chapter 
3). The nomological view has been advocated within the de Broglie–Bohm 
pilot-wave theory in order to make sense of the wave-function being defined in 
configuration space. If the wave-function is time-independent, one is inclined to 
understand it rather as something law-like than a physical field undulating in 
configuration space. In order to evaluate Gao’s critique of the nomological 
interpretation, we need to understand the distinction between the universal 
wave-function and the effective wave-function. The universal wave-function is 
the wave-function that guides all the particles in the universe together. Under 
certain circumstances, though, one can assign a wave-function to a subsystem 
of the universe, a hydrogen atom for example. This wave-function is the 
effective wave-function of the subsystem, and it is indeed the wave-function 
familiar from the application of quantum mechanics. 
 
Gao now attacks the nomological interpretation explaining that the effective 
wave-function has to encode the influences between particles inside and outside 
the system: 
 
[F]or the electron in the hydrogen atom, there are countably 
many real-valued wave functions corresponding to different 
energy eigenstates of the electron, but they may all describe a 
particle that is at rest in the same position at all times. 
Therefore, if the ontology of Bohm’s theory consists only in 
particles and their positions, then the effective wave function of a 
subsystem must encode the influences of the particles which are 
not part of the subsystem. (p. 29) 
 
According to Gao, it is a feature of the nomological interpretation that the 
effective wave-function encodes the non-local influences of the environment on 
the system (section 3.3). He refers to Esfeld et al., when they write: 
 
The non-local law of Bohmian mechanics allows us to encode the 
influence of those particles, which are not part of the subsystem 
but nevertheless have an effect on its evolution, in a single 
object: the effective wave-function, which is defined as a function 
on the subsystem’s configuration space. (2014, p. 775) 
 
This passage is, however, written before the authors discuss the ontological 
status of the wave-function. The physical effects of the effective wave-function 
are indeed totally independent of the interpretation of the wave-function. 
Irrespective of the interpretation of the wave-function, once a system has an 
effective wave-function, the system can be taken to be independent from the 
environment in the following sense: first, the guiding equation for the subsystem 
decouples from the equations of the environment, and second, the 
wave-function of the subsystem follows the Schrödinger equation. But the 
change of the effective wave-function is due to the changes in the environment. 
We recall that if the effective wave-function exists, it coincides (up to 
normalization) with the conditional wave-function defined by ψ(x,t):=Ψ(x,Y(t)), 
with Ψ the universal wave-function and Y(t) the configuration of the 
environment. Although we may mathematically describe the subsystem in utter 
ignorance of what is exactly happening in the environment, the non-local effects 
of the particles outside the system are always encoded in the effective 
wave-function. 
 
Moreover, what Esfeld et al. (2014) emphasize in the above example of the 
hydrogen atom is not non-locality but rather the meaning of energy within the 
dispositional interpretation of the wave-function. All started when Belot (2012, 
pp. 79–80) argued that if the wave-function represents the disposition of 
particles, the wave-function should uniquely determine the way particles move. 
The above example of the hydrogen atom—Belot in fact used a particle in a 
potential well—aims at showing that there are many different wave-functions 
leading to the same motion, namely a particle in rest, and so the dispositional 
view is untenable. Esfeld et al. (2014, pp. 785—6) replied that this example 
doesn’t threaten the dispositional interpretation because the wave-function not 
only encodes the motion of the particle but also how the particle will interact 
with another system relative to the energy eigenstate of the effective 
wave-function. 
 
Now that we know what the wave-function is not for Gao, let’s discover what its 
ontological status actually is. In chapter 2, Gao introduces the ​ontological 
models framework​, which provides the formal framework for his argument. This 
framework presupposes that the behavior of every quantum system is 
determined by an underlying (maybe hidden) ontic state λ and that the 
wave-function figures in the representation of this ontic state. The central 
question is now whether the wave-function is a unique representation of λ or 
whether different wave-functions can refer to the same ontic state λ. If there are 
many representations of the same ontic state, the wave-function is said to be 
ψ-​epistemic. 
 
There are two ways the wave-function can be ψ-​epistemic.​ First, a quantum 
particle gets its wave-function relative to being a member of a certain ensemble. 
For example, an electron is said to be in a spin x-up state, if it belongs to an 
ensemble of electrons, which satisfy the spin x-up statistics. If an electron is in a 
spin y-up state this means that it belongs to a spin y-up ensemble. In this case, 
where the wave-function is merely a tool for the statistical outcomes of 
ensembles, it is called ψ-​statistical.​ It may happen, though, that some particles 
in the x-up ensemble are in the same ontic state λ as some particles in the y-up 
ensemble. The statistical pattern of the ensembles doesn’t rule that out. Second, 
the wave-function can just encode the state of belief of an agent. That is, 
whether an electron is assigned spin x-up or y-up is determined by the 
knowledge of the agent. So two agents may disagree on the state of the very 
same electron—one agent may say x-up, the other may say y-up. In this case, 
the wave-function is said to be ψ-​subjective. ​(Many thanks to Tim Maudlin for 
telling me about the distinction between ψ-statistical​ ​and​ ​ψ-subjective). 
 
If the wave-function uniquely represents λ, it’s indifferent to any epistemic state 
of an agent, and every particle in the above spin example belongs to a unique 
ensemble. Then the wave-function is said to be ψ-​ontic​. The famous 
PBR-theorem rules out the wave-function to be ψ-epistemic. In particular, the 
wave-function is neither ψ-statistical nor ψ-subjective. In other words, in all 
quantum theories the wave-function has to be ψ-ontic. Hence, the statistical 
interpretation of quantum mechanics given underlying ontic states is inconsistent 
with the predictions of quantum mechanics. And if the wave-function represents 
the state of belief of an agent about the ontic state, this also leads to a 
contradiction with measurement results. 
 
Gao needs all this preparation because he will ultimately present his own ψ-ontic 
interpretation of quantum mechanics. But in order to reach the peak, there are 
some chapters left to be climbed.  
 
In chapter 4, Gao extends the ontological models framework in two ways. The 
model should be suitable for deterministic quantum theories, as well as for 
protective measurements.  It’s true that within the ontological models 
framework, one always considers standard projective measurements. So it’s 
reasonable to include protective measurements as well. It’s, however, incorrect 
that the ontological framework model excludes deterministic theories. In the 
definition of the ontological models framework, the ontic state λ determines the 
probabilities of measurement outcomes k for a given measurement M, that is, 
p(k┃λ,M). Therefore, Gao seems to assume that this framework excludes 
deterministic theories. But the ontological models framework does not exclude 
deterministic quantum theories: If we set λ=(Q,ψ) in the de Broglie–Bohm 
theory, for example, where Q refers to the positions of particles, the probabilities 
are either 0 or 1. Similarly, Bell’s theorem is valid for deterministic theories, 
even if his local causality condition may be formulated in terms of probabilities.  
 
Having extended the ontological framework model, Gao presents a PBR-type 
theorem, whose proof is considerably shorter and simpler with the help of 
protective measurements. The original proof by PBR requires two wave-functions 
and four observables, while Gao requires two wave-functions but just one 
observable. The proof is as follows. Let’s consider two spin states, x-up and y-up 
both happen to refer to the same ontic state λ, and an operator P projecting on 
the x-up state. After a protective measurement, the result of x-up protective 
measurement is 1 and the result of the y-up protective measurement is 1/2. 
Hence, the two results are incompatible with the common ontic state λ.  
 
This discussion is followed by two chapters (namely, 5 and 6), which are more 
historic. Chapter 5 gives a very clear and illuminating novel derivation of 
Schrödinger’s equation from symmetry principles in space-time. Chapter 6 
examines Schrödinger’s original idea that the wave-function represents  
charge densities. 
 
These two chapters prepare the ground for the core of Gao’s book, which are the 
chapters 7 and 8. Here he introduces and defends his preferred quantum theory, 
in which the wave-function encodes random discontinuous motion (RDM) of 
point-like particles—contrary to Nelson’s stochastic mechanics (Nelson 2012), 
this theory makes the same empirical predictions as quantum mechanics. In 
essence, the RDM-theory is a re-incarnation of Bell’s attempt to provide an 
ontology of local beables for Everett's quantum theory. Bell named it Everett (?) 
theory. Indeed, this theory is not a many-worlds theory; it rather resembles the 
de Broglie–Bohm theory without trajectories: particles jump discontinuously in 
three-dimensional space thereby fulfilling the quantum statistics. The new 
trajectories are actually just discrete points distributed in space, somehow 
similar to the GRW flash ontology. Due to this resemblance with the de 
Broglie–Bohm theory, Bell added a question mark to indicate whether his 
proposed ontology was still in the spirit of Everett.  
 
Gao shows why in the RDM-theory the wave-function is ψ-ontic, how the 
measurement problem is solved, how the Born probabilities emerge, and how 
this theory differs from other stochastic theories, like Roger Penrose’s 
gravity-induced collapse theory and the CSL theory.  
 
In the final chapter, Gao explains what challenges need to be faced in combining 
quantum theory with special relativity and how the RDM-theory may be 
extended to a relativistic version. On the final pages, Gao briefly argues that one 
can retain a particle ontology even for quantum field theory and how the 
RDM-theory may provide a satisfying ontology.  
 
All in all, this book provides novel arguments why the wave-function shall be a 
real physical object. Gao argued that the wave-function is not nomological, that 
it is ψ-ontic, and that it encodes the discontinuous jumps of particles. One can 
even go a step further in asking, “In what sense is the wave-function ψ-ontic?” 
Is it a physical field? Is it material stuff? Does it refer to properties? These are 
rather metaphysical questions, but it is exactly on the status of the 
wave-function where the border between physics and metaphysics gets blurry. 
And here metaphysicians may find a fruitful point of departure for their analysis. 
 
Gao’s book is particularly important for researchers in the foundations and 
metaphysics of quantum mechanics. Physicists and philosophers alike will find 
plenty of material for further developments. The focus on protective 
measurements and the randomly jumping particles brings in new input for 
unravelling the ontology of the wave-function, also for relativistic quantum 
theories. Shan Gao has shown us a promising path that is worth following. 
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